This article examines the states' attempt to overcome collective action problems for promoting regional integration, by highlighting such attempts by the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It considers two kinds of collective action problems: collaboration games where actors are lured to defect from an agreement in order to obtain short-term gains, and coordination games where actors face difficulty in reaching an agreement on which of multiple points will be chosen. This article argues that although ASEAN countries have not intended to establish a supranational body to resolve collective action problems, they have gradually developed feasible enforcement mechanisms by intensifying the centralised nature of the regional organisation. It also contends that some member states began to play a 'focal point' role in resolving coordination problems resulting from accelerated regional integration and market liberalisation, and the resolution of coordination problems has been pursued in a framework where extra-regional countries and environments play a significant role.
Introduction
Regionalism and regional integration have been one of the most dynamic phenomena in the current international setting. Since the early 1990s, an initiative to develop and strengthen regional institutions has intensified on a global scale. This move led to the creation of the European Union (EU) in Europe, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in North America, and Mercosur in Latin America.
Regionalism has been of great importance in terms of international relations (IR) theory. Regional integration is an attempt to realise mutual gains from cooperation within a group of self-motivated states in an anarchic international system. In order to attain a successful regional cohesion, the states have to overcome collective action problems that are endemic to international cooperation. IR theory has provided the explanation of how and under what conditions the states have promoted cooperation to achieve collective interests of the entire region.
The successful experiences of regional integration in Europe have been regarded as a model for similar attempts in other parts of the world. The European nations have established solid and institutionalised mechanisms for inter-state cooperation largely under the leadership role of major states and the creation and advancement of supranational agents. If European integration is evaluated in terms of the states' interest coordination, it might be alleged that the core factor producing the European fortune lay in the states' successful resolution of dilemmas resulting from their strategic interaction.
It is, therefore, valuable to examine how states can overcome the dilemma of collection actions pertinent to regional integration.
In considering collective action problems in international relations, two kinds of games matter. The first is collaboration games where actors are lured to defect from an agreement in order to obtain short-term gains. The problem in this game is to attain a better off situation by making the actors abandon a dominant strategy. The second is coordination games where actors face difficulty in reaching an agreement on which of multiple points will be chosen. The problem in this game is to coordinate the actors' behaviour and avoid undesirable outcomes by reaching an agreement on the certain set of patterns of code. The dilemma resulting from the two games impede the states from entering into cooperative action. This article examines the states' attempt to overcome collective action problems for promoting regional integration, by highlighting such attempts by the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The central arguments that this article advances are threefold. First, although ASEAN countries have not intended to establish a supranational body to resolve collective action problems, they have gradually developed feasible enforcement mechanisms by intensifying the centralised nature of the regional organisation. Second, some states within the region began to play a 'focal point' role in resolving coordination problems resulting from accelerated regional integration and market liberalisation. Third, the resolution of coordination problems has been pursued in a framework where extra-regional countries and environments play a significant role.
In the following section, I take a look at the literature on collective action problems concerning inter-state cooperation, and identify two kinds of dilemma. I then investigate collaboration problems pertinent to regional integration in Southeast Asia and examine ASEAN members' responses to the problems. The third section considers coordination problems with respect to regional integration in Southeast Asia.
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION
There are two kinds of collective action dilemma in promoting international cooperation: collaboration game and coordination game. The collaboration game indicates the situation where 'independent decision making leads to equilibrium outcomes that are Pareto-deficit -outcomes in which all actors prefer another given outcome to the equilibrium outcome' (Stein 1983. p. 120) . A typical example of this game is the prisoners' dilemma where individual players' rational, dominant strategies lead them to an equilibrium outcome in which they are worse of than if they cooperated.
In this game, the rational actors' pursuit of self-interest results in their being worse off than if they cooperate by abandoning their dominant strategy. Accordingly, the resolution of the collaboration game requires the actors to move away from the suboptimal equilibrium by abstaining from pursuit of narrow self-interest.
The collaboration game has been intensively discussed in the study of international relations. Inter-state agreements designed to achieve optimal common goals tend to be unstable and fragile. This is because self-interested states have substantial incentives to defect from the established patterns of behaviour in order to get better gains in the short run. However, states are allured to keep the agreements under the condition of a combination of indefinite or uncertain repetition and the threat of loss of future benefits from cooperation (Axelrod 1984) . Given these conditions, states are not tempted to defect from cooperative arrangements for fear of retaliation and loss of reputation. However, these arguments tend to break down when other states find it difficult to determine whether a state has violated commonly agreed rules due to ambiguity and incomplete information. When a conflict occurs between states, the states other than direct parties have difficulty in finding truth in various claims and counterclaims made by the parties.
The coordination game is another game that impedes the development of cooperation. The coordination game indicates the situation 'with multiple equilibria (two equilibria if there are only two actors each with two choices) in which coordination is required if the actors are to avoid that least preferred outcome' (Stein 1983, p. 125) .
A typical example of this game is called the Battle of the Sexes where both members of a couple prefer to do something together, but they disagree on their preferred outcome, vacationing in the mountains or at the ocean. The choice of mountains or ocean matters because it gives one player a higher payoff than the alternative (Krasner 1991, pp. 339-40) . The actors have strong incentives to achieve something jointly but some differences over where to coordinate for this objective. The key problem in this situation is not to avoid temptation to defect, but to decide on which of the two equilibrium points will be chosen.
Importantly, repeated coordination games make cooperation among actors more difficult because they provoke distributional problems. The outcome of iterated games provides an actor whose decisions are chosen with sufficient satisfaction, while putting other actors with second-best solutions in a growing discontent. Questions of fairness and equitable distribution of gains from cooperation need to be addressed to prevent an actor with discontent from derailing the cooperation process (Mattli 1999, p. 56) .
In international relations, coordination games occur when the states have to agree on certain codes of conduct for attaining common goals, but have different preferences on which codes are adopted. Under such conditions, the states need to coordinate their preferences and policies for common rules of the game, and adopt measures to resolve distributional conflict.
There are two methods to overcome dilemmas from the two games in international relations. The first is the establishment of international institutions. The necessary form of institutions differs between collaboration games and coordination games. As for the collaboration games, a centralised, formal organisation is required.
The centralised organisation needs to provide extensive information on the players' behaviour. This is because undetected defection will be costly for those who continue to cooperate and will complicate attempt at retaliation. Moreover, the centralised organisation is expected to prevent a state from defecting from agreements by regulating their actions within agreed-upon rules. The centralised mechanism of adjudication provides procedures to support formal agreements (Snidal 1985, p. 938) . In sum, institutional mechanisms for extensive monitoring and assessment of compliance are necessary for overcoming collaboration problems.
In the case of coordination games, a centralised, formal organisation with strong mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement is not necessarily required. Since no state would gain by departing from an established agreement, each member of a group needs to devote little attention to the prevention of cheating (Martin 1992, p. 776) . The main concern in coordination games is the harmonisation of rules and policies, and this requires low levels of institutionalisation. Accordingly, institutions are expected to perform information gathering and information consultation about the preferences and policies of the states and to provide a forum for the resolution of bargaining problems concerning the choice of specific rules (Snidal 1985, p. 938) .
However, when distributional problems resulting from repeated coordination games are serious, institutions need to perform additional functions. Institutions moderate distributional conflict by identifying one possible equilibrium point as the default or obvious one, thus reducing inter-state bargaining about the choice of a particular code of conduct, and by keeping account of deals struck, compromises made, and gains achieved in complex multi-issue institutions (Martin and Simmons 1998, p. 745).
The second method to overcome dilemmas from collective action is leadership.
The existence of a hegemonic state with preponderant material resources can facilitate 6 the resolution of collaboration games. The single dominant state has willingness and capability to provide certain kind of international public goods including a market for distress goods, a steady flow of capital, a stable structure of exchange rates, and so forth (Kindleberger 1981 : Gilpin 1987 . The hegemonic state also blocks some members' free-riding, an action to benefit from a public good without paying their share towards providing that good. Thus, leadership by a hegemonic state can overcome the collaboration game by articulating and enforcing the rules of interaction among the states.
In coordination games, leadership is also important. If there is a single, powerful state within a group, the solution of coordination games might be easy. When all or a majority of the states within the group regard a dominant state as more important to the group than that of any other state, they will find it in their interest to go along with the state's preferences and policies. Such a solution removes the need for extensive discussions and is likely to be the least costly change within the group (Martin 1992, p. 777 ). Thus, a dominant state within the group may serve as a focal point in the coordination of rules, regulations and policies. 1 Moreover, the existence of a single, powerful state might resolve dilemmas from the distributional consequences of coordination. The leading state may be able and willing to assume the role of a paymaster, easing distributional tensions that arise from the inequitable distribution of gains from cooperation, for example, through side-payments (Mattli 1999, p. 56) .
The above argument regarding collective action problems is applied to regional integration. The success and failure of regional integration is explained by the region's capabilities to overcome collaboration games and coordination games. A region that has attained a high level of regional cohesion has resolved dilemmas from the member states' strategic interaction by developing a formal regional organisation with monitoring and enforcement authorities, and by holding a state that has will and capabilities to become a focal point for regional affairs and assume disproportionately large burdens for rectifying distributional inequalities. 1 The concept of focal point was originally introduced by Schelling. It is referred to as the 'point for each person's expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do' (Schelling 1960, p.57) .
A representative region that has successfully developed regional integration with both an effective formal organisation and an undisputed leader state is Europe. EU members gradually changed their previous pattern of bilateral, self-enforcing arrangements into a pattern of third-party enforcement mechanisms under the centralised supranational agents. Agents such as the European Commission and the European Count of Justice (ECJ) have qualified to set up and guarantee the legal systems to enforce decision on the member states, and the expanding scope of regional affairs has been covered by the systems. The commission has observed whether individuals, companies and member states do not act in ways which run counter to the treaties or EU secondary law (Mattli 1999, p. 100) . The ECJ has played monitoring and enforcing roles by securing that EU law has primacy over national legislation and has direct effects on the members' society. Especially after the return to the qualified majority voting in the Single European Act in 1987, both the centralisation of decisionmaking systems and the surrender of individual states' decision-making power were strengthened.
In the European integration process, Germany acted as the key policy initiator and agenda setter. The country took the lead in launching the idea of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978, relaunching the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1988, and a calling for an inter-governmental conference on political union to parallel the proposed EMU in 1990 (Katzenstein 1997, p. 26) . Germany launched nearly all its initiatives with France or other members in order to avoid the temptation of trying to set the European agenda unilaterally. Moreover, Germany has been by far the largest net contributor to the EU budget. By 1996, Germany's financial contribution to the EU amounted to some two-thirds of the net revenue of the union, double its share of the total gross domestic product in the EU (Katzenstein 1997, p. 28) .
While the European success has provided a direct spur to regional integration in other parts of the world, the European model is not applied to other regions in a straightforward way. Most regions hold states that are reluctant to allow a regional organisation to make surveillance and enforcement decisions on their behaviour, and lack a dominant state that takes a leadership role in advancing collective interests of the entire region. However, these regions have substantial incentives to bind the economies of the regional states together and to develop collective mechanisms to cope with problems arising inside or outside the regions. How have such regions sought to achieve these objectives by overcoming the two types of collective action dilemmas? What kinds of regional institutions or organisations have they developed in order to resolve dilemmas deriving from the states' strategic interaction? How has a major state in the regions behaved in order to advance collective benefits for regional cohesion? This article addresses these questions by taking up as a case ASEAN's commitments to regional integration since the late 1990s.
Since the late 1990s, ASEAN members have faced serious economic and political challenges due to the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 and likely marginalisation due to the rapid economic growth of China and India. In order to respond positively to these climates, the member states had to pursue deeper regional integration. A main interest in this respect is how the ASEAN states have sought to resolve collaboration problems by preventing the defection of a member from agreements to promote regional integration. The deepening of regional integration required the harmonisation of policies and standards adopted by member states. Moreover, the expansion of When no amicable settlement could be reached through bilateral consultation and negotiations, a dispute can be referred to a senior economic officials meeting (SEOM) first, and then appealed to an AEM meeting. Moreover, the mechanism did not provide sufficient regulations to implement the final ruling. A member state that fails to comply with the ruling faces no punitive measures, but shall enter into negotiations with any party having involved the dispute settlement procedures with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation (Hund 2002, p. 108) .
Despite the launching of various programmes for market liberalisation, the actual implementation progress did not go smoothly. The agreement to create AFTA was reached within ten months of its initial proposal. Accordingly, the agreement did not include details for implementation, and backsliding moves immediately emerged. At the third AFTA Council in December 1992, each member state revealed the CEPT plan.
But, there were variations in the time to begin trade liberalisation: Singapore from January 1993; Malaysia from 1993; Brunei from 1994; Thailand and Indonesia from 1995; and the Philippines from 1996 (Yamakage 1997, p. 199) . The diversity in implementation became apparent only one year after the conclusion of the agreement.
More importantly, the implementation of AFTA was undermined by some states' attempt to defect from the agreement. Among several incidents, two were typical. The Second, Singapore and the Philippines had conflicts over import tariff reduction on the latter's petrochemical products. In December 2002, Manila submitted a list of 11 petrochemical products whose tariffs would be maintained at between 7 to 10 %.
According to the CEPT scheme, the Philippines was to have lowered tariffs on the products to 5 %. Singapore accused Manila's decision as hurting AFTA's reputation as a cohesive trading bloc and asked for compensation for damages suffered by its exporters. Manuel Roxas, Secretary of Trade and Industry, stated that the Philippines remained committed to ASEAN solidarity but, 'we are considering of our commitment to ASEAN's obligation. But, we have national interest to consider. The Philippines deems the petrochemical industries to be a strategic sector '. 4 The above incidents indicated ASEAN's failure to secure the original commitments to market integration. AFTA's non-binding, flexible character allowed a member to defect from an agreement when she was forced to protect the interests of major domestic industries. The other members were unable to block such moves, being forced to adopt the downward, patchwork revisions of commitments from those previously agreed. Indeed, informality, one of the norms of the 'ASEAN Way', should be compensated by 'peer pressure'. 5 However, peer pressure did not work effectively in AFTA's implementation process. ASEAN, an intergovernmental 'neighbourhood watch group', was not equipped with the authorities to enforce the agreement with legallybased monitoring mechanisms (Khoo 2000). ASEAN's weak institutional character could not resolve collaboration games in which each member pursued short-term gains rather than long-term collective benefits.
The strength of implementation mechanisms
In the new millennium, a concrete initiative for further regional integration was set forth. At the ninth summit in October 2003, ASEAN leaders agreed to establish an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). 6 The AEC intended to transform ASEAN into a common market by 2020 along the lines of the European Economic Community. The AEC would be a single market and production base with a free flow of goods, services, investment, and skilled labour. Unlike a normal common market, the AEC restricted a flow of labour to skilled labourers and business persons, and did not plan to set up a uniform tariff rate on non-members. Accordingly, the AEC is called a FTA-plus agreement. The body would perform a quasi-judicial function by reviewing a trade dispute and issuing a judgement that is not legally binding, but can be used to take steps to settle the disputes. Importantly, these mechanisms were modelled from the EU and World Trade Organisation (WTO). Whereas the ACT imitated the example of the EU Solvit mechanism, the ACB was modelled after the WTO Textile Monitoring Body.
The ASEAN members strengthened a formal dispute settlement mechanism. In ASEAN leaders. In the European integration process, the business associations played a critical role in promoting the unification of the European market, and their activities were often conducted in close collaboration with the European Commission. With no political constituency of their own, the commissioners looked to the business associations to strengthen their powers and authorities vis-à-vis the member states (Cowles 1995, p. 230) . Unlike the European case where the business associations were formed by individual corporate executives, the ABAC was organised by ASEAN leaders. However, it has the potential of becoming a strong ally to the Secretariat whose major mission is to promote regional integration.
It is broadly known that ASEAN members were extremely reluctant to relinquish their power to a supranational body. In general, the members' vital interest has been the maintenance of domestic cohesion and the relinquishing of sovereignty to a supranational body has been regarded as jeopardising this vital interest. More narrowly, the ruling elites of each state who have developed domestic institutions in favour of the status quo were unwilling to cede power to an independent, unpredictable agency (Tan 2005, p. ASEAN members' reluctance to delegate the authority to a supranational institution did not imply their unwillingness to strengthen reliable mechanisms and processes to secure the compliance of agreements. Davidson (2005, p. 19 ) presents two aspects of delegation: delegating the authority to interpret/ apply the rules and resolve disputes; and delegating the authority to make further rules. ASEAN members are cautious about delegating the authority to make further rules, but they have gradually delegated the authority to interpret/apply the rules and resolve disputes. The members established clearer goals towards a unified market and adopted more rule-based mechanisms to ensure the proper implementation of agreements. These moves were accompanied by strengthening the roles and authorities of the ASEAN Secretariat as a formal, centralised body to overview ASEAN's efforts to advance regional cohesion.
In brief, when ASEAN members launched an initiative to form a common market, they strengthened mechanisms to overcome the problems of collaboration dilemma, which were common in the AFTA implementation process. They strengthened enforcement mechanisms and the monitoring systems of the agreements. The ASEAN members had no intentions of delegating authority to ASEAN and changing it into a supranational body. However, the formal and centralised nature of the organisation gradually developed through enhanced functions of the ASEAN Secretariat.
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS

The harmonisation of standards for the integrated market
The realisation of a unified market in a given region requires the harmonisation of policies and standards adopted by the states in the region. This is particularly important for trade facilitation and industrial competitiveness. In Europe, for instance, the harmonisation of national standards and the adoption of mutual recognition constituted a key to the smooth process of market integration (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989, p. 116; Hufbauer 2000, p. 11-12) . One initiative is the establishment of a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for telecom equipment. Such an agreement will enable Thai telecom equipment that have been tested and certified in Thailand to be accepted in Singapore without further certification, and vice versa. This will save our businessmen money and time, and will boost trade in such ICT products. Consumers will also benefit, as lower costs and higher volumes will help to drive down prices. 14 The two states' intention of becoming a focal point for policy coordination in the entire region was explicitly stated by Singaporean Prime Minister Goh. At the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Business and Investment Summit, Goh stated that 'Our aim is to showcase these bilateral projects and their results, to encourage other members of ASEAN to join in. Both countries will take first to the dance floor to "tango". When other ASEAN members join in later, we will have a livelier party '. 15 While Singapore and Thailand began to play a focal point role in promoting coordination in standards harmonisation and MRAs for regional integration, they also Singapore and Thailand expected that this bilateral move would urge other ASEAN fellows to promote market integration. However, some of these fellows were apprehensive that these bilateral strategies would undermine ASEAN's solidarity (Dent 2005) . Importantly, Singapore and Thailand pursued this bilateral strategy largely because they needed to secure individual interests in increasing competitive challenges in the globalisation era. On the one hand, they had to strengthen their economic position in the global market, and on the other hand, they sought to respond positively to direct challenges posed by China's growing economic potent. The growing integration of the economies of Thailand and Singapore into the global and extra-regional environments constrained their policy choices for regional economic affairs.
In summary, given the growing threat of marginalisation due to intensive moves 
The ASEAN divide problem
Continuous process for regional integration was desirable for the entire ASEAN members. However, the accelerated process of market liberalisation for regional integration had a risk of provoking distributional problems by producing negative effects on the economy of less developed members through intensified competition.
This issue was serious for ASEAN that had the development gap problem when it achieved the ASEAN 10 by accepting the Indochina countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, CLMV) in the late 1990s. 16 There were serious gaps in development between the old members and the newly joined CLMV. Indeed, per capita GDP in the old ASEAN members declined after 1996, but gap between the old and new ASEAN members remained stark (Table 1 ). The CLMV contributed only 8 % of total GDP in 2003, compared with their 28 % contribution in terms of population.
Singaporeans were on average 35 times richer than the Vietnamese and 68 times than the Cambodians. The resolution of development divide was a serious hurdle to deeper integration. The state that proposed a concrete policy to cope with the development gap Indeed, Singapore's contribution to the IAI Work Plan was not significant. Its amount was ranked the fourth among the ASEAN six (Table 2) . However, Singapore has contributed a large amount to projects other than the IAI Work Plan, providing the 33.3 % of total contributions to CLMV by the ASEAN six. It might be possible to regard the IAI as a corresponding programme to the EC's policy to strengthen its 'structural funds' in preparation for the single market. 19 The role that Singapore and Thailand sought to play resembles to that of Germany in the EC, and they surely have contributed a lion's shares to the CLMV. However, Singapore and Thailand might not hold sufficient capabilities to become a paymaster for the Indochina countries. Singapore retains the highest per capita income and technology level, but it was ranked the fourth among ASEAN members in terms of total GDP in 2003 (Table   1 ). Thailand was ranked the second, but its per capita income was below Malaysia.
Thus, their economic and technical capabilities are not comparable to those of Germany in the EC, which represented the dominant economic position by one country, sharing almost one-quarter of the community's GDP and external/internal trade (Mattli 1999, p. 102).
Thailand and Singapore played a coordination role in securing funds from its 19 In February 1989, the European Council agreed that by 1992, the amount of EC structural funds should be doubled to compensate depressed regions for intensified competition resulting from a unified market (Hufbauer 1990, p. 11) . US$13.7 million out of total US$20.1 million worth of projects in grants (ASEAN Secretariat 2005a, p. 7).
Thus, coordination games emerged as a serious challenge to ASEAN's integration after the association completed the ASEAN ten. Although the ASEAN Secretariat strengthened internal organisation in order to cope with distributional problems, its influence was still weak. Instead, Singapore and Thailand began to play a pivotal role.
Singapore launched a programme to rectify development gaps between the old and new members. Thailand also proceeded with an independent strategy to sustain economic development in the Indochina countries. While both states have provided the preponderant share of financial support for the Indochina countries, the overall economic capabilities were limited. Accordingly, they sought to gain economic support from extra-regional countries.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has examined how ASEAN members have advanced regional integration by overcoming dilemmas from collaboration games and coordination games. Unlike the EU, ASEAN members have little interest in developing the organisation into a supranational agency, nor being led by a hegemonic regional power that has the willingness and capabilities to enforce the rules of interaction on other states. Under such conditions, how have the ASEAN members tried to achieve a steady path to regional cohesion?
Given growing moves toward regionalism in North America and Europe, ASEAN members decided on the formation of AFTA in 1992. Afterwards, they accelerated the schedule of trade liberalisation for AFTA and expanded the scope of market integration, targeting investment areas and services. However, its implementation process was accompanied by some members' defection from implementing agreements that were non-binding. The problem of collaboration games clearly appeared in AFTA's implementation process.
In the new millennium, ASEAN members launched a new programme for market integration: the formation of the AEC by 2020. In order to achieve this goal, they needed to overcome dilemmas from collaboration games that were seen in the previous cohesion programme. They developed mechanisms to ensure the proper implementation of agreements and provided stronger dispute settlement mechanisms. These mechanisms aimed at mitigating a state's incentives to defect from the agreements and reducing ambiguity about the agreements. Moreover, the ASEAN members strengthened the centralised nature of the ASEAN Secretariat by granting more functions and roles. Indeed, Southeast Asia remains beholden to sovereignty as the fundamental principle of stability, and the ASEAN members have no intention of relinquishing sovereignty to a supranational agent. However, this does not mean that they have done nothing to strengthen the codes of conduct for the compliance of agreements. They gradually provided the existing organisation with more formal, stronger authority.
As far as coordination problems are concerned, the development of formal institutions was not noteworthy. Indeed, an internal organ to coordinate distribution problems was set up, but ASEAN's overall functions were still limited. However, two states began to play a leadership role in settling dilemma from coordination problems.
Singapore and Thailand jointly sought to become a focal point for standards harmonisation and MRAs in order to achieve desirable regional integration. They also took the lead in resolving distributional problems from closer market integration among the members by launching new policies to provide support for less developed Indochina countries.
A distinctive factor that has influenced the resolution of coordination problems in Southeast Asia was influences from the external environments and extra-regional states.
On the positive side, some extra-regional states have contributed to the resolution of the problems. On the issues of standards harmonisation and development gap, ASEAN members received significant assistance from the extra-regional states. ASEAN, which lacks a paymaster state, located the resolution of distributional problems in the network of support from its dialogue partners. On the negative side, extra-regional power undermined the policy cohesion of ASEAN. Indeed, Thailand and Singapore began to play a significant role in leading the integration process. However, these two states created and strengthened moves that might weaken internal integration by maintaining close economic linkages with extra-regional states. ASEAN, an organisation comprised of small states, has faced difficulty in resolving internal dilemma for close cooperation.
A the same time, the members have to show capabilities to take advantage of external 
